
Mercury layer A private non-custodial layer-2 for Bitcoin

Tom Trevethan - CTO Commerceblock

Bitcoin transactions



Transactions change ownership

Require confirmation in blockchain

Limited space: high fees and long confirmation times



Private keys ...

Can we just send private keys?






Off-chain: free, instant and private

BUT: have to trust sender to delete their key










Private keys ...

How to prevent the previous owner from stealing?

1. Via trusted hardware




e.g. Opendime

Private keys ...

How to prevent the previous owner from stealing?


2. Using a trusted key-share update server: Statechains




Mercury protocol

Single shared public key -> P2(W)PKH on-chain output

Multiplicative private shares: $P = s_1 s_E G$. (shared secret key $s_1 s_E$ is never computed or known)






If the previous value of S_E is deleted, previous owners cannot steal the UTXO even if SE colludes or is hacked.

Mercury protocol

Transfer: Key share update protocol






Multiplicative private shares: **PubKey** = s_1s_1 .G. (shared secret key s_1s_1 is never computed or known)

Mercury protocol

Off-chain (backup) transactions via decrementing nLocktime

- Compatible with current Bitcoin protocol rules
- Previous owner attacks not possible

... this limits number of transfers and statecoin lifetime




Mercury wallet


Launched 2021: Over 25 BTC deposited Over 80,000 coin swaps

But:

- Public keys and TxIDs known to server
- Statecoin UTXOs identifiable on-chain \bullet
- 2-Party ECDSA complex and slow

? 🌣 ⊡ TOR / 12P \bigcirc





Mercury wallet

Launched 2021: Over 25 BTC deposited Over 80,000 coin swaps

But:

- Public keys and TxIDs known to server
- Statecoin UTXOs identifiable on-chain
- 2-Party ECDSA complex and slow


Solutions:

- Blind 2 party Schnorr signatures (MuSig)
- Statechain entity signature count
- Full client-side verification Server only reports *number* of co-signings
- Server completely blind to any on-chain identification




Blind 2-Party Schnorr

- Two parties required to generate a signature on shared public key
- One party (SE) does not learn: 1) The full shared public key. 2) The message (sighash) or 2) The final signature




Blind 2-Party Schnorr

- Two parties required to generate a signature on shared public key
- or 2) The final signature



• One party (SE) does not learn: 1) The full shared public key. 2) The message (sighash)

Blind 2-Party Schnorr



Mercury Layer

Blind 2-party Schnorr enables a completely blind SE. SE trusted to report number of signatures, instead of enforcing rules.

SE is unable to have any knowledge of the on-chain identity of coins

Mercury Layer + atomic coinswaps completely on-chain transaction graph

Lightning latch protocol enables atomic statecoin/LN transactions

Blinded version of MuSig2 (with TC/HSM support) Mercury layer server (Rust) Mercury layer WASM (Rust) client React-app client

<u>github.com/commerceblock/mercury</u>layer Telegram: mercurywallet





Bitcoin 2nd layers:

Lightning:

Trustless (in principle) Verifiable Unilateral exit **Requires liquidity Arbitrary Payments** (dependent on channels)

Mercury:

Trust required Verifiable Unilateral exit Pro-actively noncustodial Whole UTXOs Completely blind

Fedimint/Cashu:

Trust required Non-verifiable Fully custodial **Arbitrary Payments** Private payments Deposit/withdrawal identifiable

Liquid:

Trust required Verifiable Fully custodial Arbitrary Payments Peg in/out identifiable

